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Can relativistic bit commitment lead to secure quantum oblivious transfer?
Guang Ping He∗
School of Physics and Engineering, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, P. R. China
While unconditionally secure bit commitment (BC) is considered impossible within the quantum
framework, it can be obtained under relativistic or experimental constraints. Here we study whether
such BC can lead to secure quantum oblivious transfer (QOT). The answer is not completely neg-
ative. On one hand, we provide a detailed cheating strategy, showing that the “honest-but-curious
adversaries” in some of the existing no-go proofs on QOT still apply even if secure BC is used,
enabling the receiver to increase the average reliability of the decoded value of the transferred bit.
On the other hand, it is also found that some other no-go proofs claiming that a dishonest receiver
can always decode all transferred bits simultaneously with reliability 100% become invalid in this
scenario, because their models of cryptographic protocols are too ideal to cover such a BC-based
QOT.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Ac, 42.50.Dv, 03.65.Ud, 03.30.+p
I. INTRODUCTION
Besides the well-known quantum key distribution
(QKD) [1], bit commitment (BC) and oblivious transfer
(OT) are also essential cryptographic primitives. It was
shown that OT is the building block of multi-party se-
cure computations and more complicated “post-cold-war
era” multi-party cryptographic protocols [2], and quan-
tum OT (QOT) can be obtained basing on quantum BC
(QBC) [3]. But it is widely accepted that uncondition-
ally secure QBC is impossible within the quantum frame-
work [4]-[29]. This result, known as the Mayers-Lo-Chau
(MLC) no-go theorem, is considered as putting a seri-
ous drawback on quantum cryptography. Obviously, it
indicates that QOT built upon QBC cannot be secure
either. This stimulated the emergence of many other
no-go proofs on quantum two-party secure computations
including QOT [30–38].
Nevertheless, Kent showed that BC can be uncondi-
tionally secure under relativistic settings [39–42]. Re-
cently, these relativistic BC protocols were implemented
experimentally [43, 44]. Also, there were many propos-
als on “practical” QBC, which are secure if the partici-
pants are limited by some experimental constraints, such
as individual measurements or limited coherent measure-
ments, misaligned reference frames, unstability of parti-
cles, Gaussian operations with non-Gaussian states, etc.
(see the introduction of Ref. [45] for a detailed list).
Therefore, it is natural to ask whether these BC pro-
tocols can lead to secure QOT. That is, suppose that any
setting or constraint required to guarantee the security
of the above BC protocols is satisfied, so that the par-
ticipants can use them as a secure “black box” without
caring the internal details of these protocols. Then we
put no constraint (except those forbidden by fundamen-
tal physics laws) on the participants’ behaviors in other
steps of the BC-based QOT. Note that in this scenario,
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it may not be straight-forward to apply some common
methods adopted for proving the impossibility of QBC
and related no-go theorems, e.g., replacing any protocol
with an ideal model which contains quantum communica-
tions and unitary transformations only. This is because
now there is the secure “black box” QBC stands in the
middle of the QOT process, so that some cheating strate-
gies may be interrupted at this stage. Thus it is impor-
tant to reexamine whether the no-go proofs of QOT still
apply, and if yes, how the cheating is performed.
In this paper, the answer is twofold. On one hand,
we will provide a cheating strategy in details, showing
that some of the no-go proofs [31–37] remain valid even if
QOT is based on secure BC. On the other hand, we found
that some other no-go proofs [30, 38] no longer work in
such a QOT protocol, revealing that these proofs are not
sufficiently general.
II. DEFINITIONS
BC is a cryptographic task between two remote par-
ties Charlie and Diana (generally called Alice and Bob in
literature. But to avoid confusing with the roles in OT,
here we name them differently). It generally includes two
phases. In the commit phase, Charlie decides the value
of the bit x (x = 0 or 1) which he wants to commit,
and sends Diana a piece of evidence. Later, in the un-
veil phase, Charlie announces the value of x, and Diana
checks it with the evidence. An unconditionally secure
BC protocol needs to be both binding (i.e., Charlie can-
not change the value of x after the commit phase) and
concealing (Diana cannot know x before the unveil phase)
without relying on any computational assumption.
In the quantum case, Charlie’s input can be more com-
plicated. Besides the two classical values 0 and 1, he can
commit a quantum superposition or mixture of the states
corresponding to x = 0 and x = 1, so that x can be un-
veiled as either 0 or 1 with the probabilities p0 and p1,
respectively. More specifically, suppose that a QBC pro-
tocol requires Charlie to send Diana a quantum system
2Ψ as the evidence in the commit phase, whose state is
expected to be |ψ0〉Ψ (if x = 0) or |ψ1〉Ψ (if x = 1). Then
Charlie can introduce another system C, and prepare
C ⊗Ψ in the entangled state
|C ⊗Ψ〉 = p1/20 |c0〉C ⊗ |ψ0〉Ψ + p1/21 |c1〉C ⊗ |ψ1〉Ψ , (1)
where |c0〉C and |c1〉C are orthogonal. He sends Ψ to
Diana and keeps C to himself. When it is time to un-
veil, Charlie measures C in the basis {|c0〉C , |c1〉C}, and
unveils the committed x as 0 (or 1) if the result is |c0〉C
(or |c1〉C). With this strategy, his commitment was kept
at the quantum level until the unveil phase, instead of
taking a fixed classical value.
According to Kent [46], this “is not considered a secu-
rity failure of a quantum BC protocol per se”. As long
as a BC protocol can force Charlie to commit to a proba-
bility distribution (p0, p1) which cannot be changed after
the commit phase, and (p0+p1)−1 can be made arbitrar-
ily close to 0 by increasing some security parameters of
the protocol, then it is still considered as unconditionally
secure. On the other hand, if a protocol can further force
Charlie to commit to a particular classical x, i.e., besides
p0 + p1 → 1, both p0 and p1 can only take the values 0
or 1 instead of any value in between, then it is called a
bit commitment with a certificate of classicality (BCCC).
All the above mentioned BC protocols [39–42, 45] are not
BCCC, and unconditionally secure BCCC seems impos-
sible [46]. Therefore, in the following when speaking of
secure BC, we refer to the non-BCCC ones only, except
where noted.
OT is also a two-party cryptography. There are two
major types of OT in literature. Using Cre´peau’s de-
scription [47], they are defined as follows.
Definition A: All-or-nothing OT (AoN OT)
(A-i) Alice knows one bit b.
(A-ii) Bob gets bit b from Alice with the probability
1/2.
(A-iii) Bob knows whether he got b or not.
(A-iv) Alice does not know whether Bob got b or not.
Definition B: One-out-of-two OT (1-2 OT)
(B-i) Alice knows two bits b0 and b1.
(B-ii) Bob gets bit bj and not bj¯ with Pr(j = 0) =
Pr(j = 1) = 1/2.
(B-iii) Bob knows which of b0 or b1 he got.
(B-iv) Alice does not know which bj Bob got.
We will study BC-based AoN OT first, and come back
to 1-2 OT later.
III. INSECURITY
According to Yao [3], AoN QOT can be built upon BC
as follows.
The BC-based AoN QOT protocol:
(I) Let |0, 0〉 and |0, 1〉 be two orthogonal states of a
qubit, and define |1, 0〉 ≡ (|0, 0〉 + |0, 1〉)/√2, |1, 1〉 ≡
(|0, 0〉−|0, 1〉)/√2. That is, the state of a qubit is denoted
as |ai, gi〉, where ai represents the basis and gi distin-
guishes the two states in the same basis. For i = 1, ..., n,
Alice randomly picks ai, gi ∈ {0, 1} and sends Bob a qubit
φi in the state |ai, gi〉.
(II) For i = 1, ..., n, Bob randomly picks a basis bi ∈
{0, 1} to measure φi and records the result as |bi, hi〉.
Then he commits (bi, hi) to Alice using the BC protocol.
(III) Alice randomly picks a subset R ⊆ {1, ..., n} and
tests Bob’s commitment at positions in R. If any i ∈ R
reveals ai = bi and gi 6= hi, then Alice stops the protocol;
otherwise, the test result is accepted.
(IV) Alice announces the bases ai (i = 1, ..., n). Let
T0 be the set of all 1 ≤ i ≤ n with ai = bi, and T1
be the set of all 1 ≤ i ≤ n with ai 6= bi. Bob chooses
I0 ⊆ T0 − R, I1 ⊆ T1 − R with |I0| = |I1| = 0.24n, and
sets {J0, J1} = {I0, I1} or {J0, J1} = {I1, I0} at random,
then sends {J0, J1} to Alice.
(V) Alice picks a random s ∈ {0, 1}, and sends s, βs =
b
⊕
i∈Js
gi to Bob. Bob computes b = βs
⊕
i∈Js
hi if Js = I0;
otherwise does nothing.
Now suppose that the BC protocol used in this QOT is
secure. That is, no matter we use relativistic BC [39–42],
or “practical” QBC protocols listed in the introduction
of Ref. [45], we assume that all the security requirements
(e.g., relativistic settings or experimental limitations) are
already met, so that Bob does not have unlimited compu-
tational power to cheat within the BC stage. In this case,
the validity of the no-go proofs of QOT [30–38] cannot be
taken for granted, because all these proofs were derived
without implying any limitation on the computational
power of the cheater.
Intriguingly, the conclusions of some of the no-go
proofs [31–37] remain valid, that unconditionally secure
QOT is still impossible in this case. The key reason is
that secure BC, being not a BCCC, cannot avoid the par-
ticipant keeping the commitment at the quantum level
instead of taking a fixed classical value. Kent [39] briefly
mentioned that it will allow more general coherent quan-
tum attacks to be used on schemes of which BC is a
subprotocol, but no details of the cheating strategy was
given. Here we will elaborate how Bob can make use of
this feature to break the BC-based QOT protocol.
For each φi (i = 1, ..., n), a dishonest Bob does not
pick a classical bi and measure it in step (II). Instead,
he introduces two ancillary qubit systems Bi and Hi as
the registers for the bits bi and hi, and prepares their
initial states as |Bi〉 = (|0〉B+ |1〉B)/
√
2 and |Hi〉 = |0〉H ,
respectively. Here |0〉 and |1〉 are orthogonal. Then he
3applies the unitary transformation
U1 ≡ |0〉B 〈0| ⊗ |0, 0〉φ 〈0, 0| ⊗ IH
+ |0〉B 〈0| ⊗ |0, 1〉φ 〈0, 1| ⊗ σ(x)H
+ |1〉B 〈1| ⊗ |1, 0〉φ 〈1, 0| ⊗ IH
+ |1〉B 〈1| ⊗ |1, 1〉φ 〈1, 1| ⊗ σ(x)H (2)
on the systemBi⊗φi⊗Hi. Here IH and σ(x)H are the iden-
tity operator and Pauli matrix of system Hi that satisfy
IH |0〉H = |0〉H and σ(x)H |0〉H = |1〉H , respectively. The
effect of U1 is like running a quantum computer program
that if |Bi〉 = |0〉B (|Bi〉 = |1〉B) then measures qubit φi
in the basis bi = 0 (bi = 1), and stores the result hi in
system Hi. It differs from a classical program with the
same function as no destructive measurement is really
performed, since U1 is not a projective operator. Conse-
quently, the bits bi and hi are kept at the quantum level
instead of being collapsed to classical values.
Bob then commits (bi, hi) to Alice at the quantum
level. This can always be done in a BC protocol which
does not satisfy the definition of BCCC. For example, to
commit bi, Bob further introduces two ancillary systems
E and Ψ and prepares the initial state as
|E ⊗Ψ〉0 = |e0〉E ⊗ |ψ0〉Ψ . (3)
Let UE⊗Ψ be a unitary transformation onE⊗Ψ satisfying
UE⊗Ψ |e0〉E ⊗ |ψ0〉Ψ = |e1〉E ⊗ |ψ1〉Ψ. Here |ψ0〉Ψ, |ψ1〉Ψ
have the same meanings as these in Eq. (1), and |e0〉E ,|e1〉E are orthogonal. Bob applies the unitary transfor-
mation
U2 ≡ |0〉B 〈0| ⊗ IE⊗Ψ + |1〉B 〈1| ⊗ UE⊗Ψ (4)
on system Bi⊗E⊗Ψ, where IE⊗Ψ is the identity operator
of system E ⊗ Ψ. As a result, we can see that the final
state of Bi ⊗ φi ⊗Hi ⊗E ⊗Ψ will be very similar to Eq.
(1) if we view Bi ⊗ φi ⊗Hi ⊗E as system C. Then Bob
can follow the process after Eq. (1) (note that now Bob
plays the role of Charlie) to complete the commitment of
bi without collapsing it to a classical value. He can do
the same to hi.
Back to step (III) of the QOT protocol. Whenever
(bi, hi) (i ∈ R) are picked to test the commitment, Bob
simply unveils them honestly. Since these (bi, hi) will no
longer be useful in the remaining steps of the protocol, it
does not hurt Bob’s cheating. Note that the rest (bi, hi)
(i /∈ R) are still kept at the quantum level. After Alice
announced all bases ai (i = 1, ..., n) in step (IV), Bob
introduces a single global control qubit S′ for all i, ini-
tialized in the state |s′〉 = (|0〉S′ + |1〉S′)/
√
2, and yet
another ancillary system Γi for each i ∈ T0 ∪ T1 − R
initialized in the state |Γi〉 = |0〉Γ. Then he applies the
unitary transformation
U3 ≡ |0〉S′ 〈0| ⊗ |ai〉B 〈ai| ⊗ IΓ
+ |0〉S′ 〈0| ⊗ |¬ai〉B 〈¬ai| ⊗ σ(x)Γ
+ |1〉S′ 〈1| ⊗ |ai〉B 〈ai| ⊗ σ(x)Γ
+ |1〉S′ 〈1| ⊗ |¬ai〉B 〈¬ai| ⊗ IΓ (5)
on the incremented system S′⊗Bi⊗Γi. Here IΓ and σ(x)Γ
are the identity operator and Pauli matrix of system Γi
that satisfies IΓ |0〉Γ = |0〉Γ and σ(x)Γ |0〉Γ = |1〉Γ, respec-
tively. The effect of U3 is to compare ai with bi and store
the result (ai 6= bi) ⊕ s′ in Γi. Bob then measures all Γi
(i ∈ T0 ∪ T1 −R) in the basis {|0〉Γ , |1〉Γ}, takes T0 (T1)
as the set of all 1 ≤ i ≤ n with |Γi〉 = |0〉Γ (|Γi〉 = |1〉Γ)
instead of how they were defined in step (IV), and always
sets J0 ⊆ T0 − R, J1 ⊆ T1 −R to finish the rest parts of
the QOT protocol.
With this method, the relationship between J0, J1 and
I0, I1 are kept at the quantum level. Since I0 (I1) denotes
the set corresponding to ai = bi (ai 6= bi). We can see
that U3 makes J0 = I0, J1 = I1 when s
′ = 0, while
J0 = I1, J1 = I0 when s
′ = 1. As S′ was initialized as
|s′〉 = (|0〉S′ + |1〉S′)/
√
2, the actual result of step (IV)
can be described by the entangled state∣∣∣∣∣S′ ⊗ (
⊗
i
Bi ⊗ φi ⊗Hi ⊗ E′i)
〉
→ |Φb〉 = (|0〉S′ ⊗ |J0 = I0 ∨ J1 = I1〉
+ |1〉S′ ⊗ |J0 = I1 ∨ J1 = I0〉)/
√
2. (6)
Here E′i stands for all the ancillary systems Bob
introduced in the process of committing (bi, hi).
|J0 = I0 ∨ J1 = I1〉 denotes the state of system
⊗
i
Bi ⊗
φi⊗Hi⊗E′i, in which the subsystems Bi and Hi contain
the correct bi and hi corresponding to J0 = I0 ∨ J1 = I1.
The meaning of |J0 = I1 ∨ J1 = I0〉 is also similar.
After Alice announced s and βs in step (V), the sys-
tems under Bob’s possession can be viewed as
|Φb〉 = (|s〉S′ ⊗ |Js = I0〉+ |¬s〉S′ ⊗ |fail〉)/
√
2. (7)
It means that if Bob measures system S′ in the basis
{|0〉S′ , |1〉S′} and the result |s′〉S′ satisfies s′ = s, then
he is able to measure the rest systems and get all the
correct hi to decode the secret bit b unambiguously; else
if the result satisfies s′ 6= s, then he knows that he fails
to decode b. Now the most tricky part is, as the value
of s′ was kept at the quantum level before system S′
is measured, at this stage a dishonest Bob can choose
not to measure S′ in the basis {|0〉S′ , |1〉S′}. Instead, by
denoting |b〉 ≡ |s〉S′⊗|Js = I0〉, and |?〉 ≡ |¬s〉S′⊗|fail〉,
Eq. (7) can be treated as |Φb〉 = (|b〉 + |?〉)/
√
2 where
|b = 0〉 ≡ ( 1 0 0 )T , |b = 1〉 ≡ ( 0 1 0 )T , and |?〉 ≡
( 0 0 1 )T are mutually orthogonal. Then according to
Eq. (33) of Ref. [33], Bob can distinguish them using the
4positive operator-valued measure (POVM) (E0, I − E0),
where
E0 =
1
6

 2 +
√
3 −1 1 +√3
−1 2−√3 1−√3
1 +
√
3 1−√3 2

 . (8)
This allows Bob’s decoded b to match Alice’s actual in-
put with reliability (1 +
√
3/2)/2 [33]. On the contrary,
when Bob executes the QOT protocol honestly, in 1/2 of
the cases he can decode b with reliability 100%; in the
rest 1/2 cases he fails to decode b, he can guess the value
randomly, which results in a reliability of 50%. Thus the
average reliability in the honest case is 100%/2+50%/2 =
75% < (1 +
√
3/2)/2. Note that in the above dishonest
strategy, in any case Bob can never decode b with relia-
bility 100%. Therefore it is debatable whether it can be
considered as a successful cheating, as the strategy does
not even accomplish what an honest Bob can do. That
is why it is called honest -but-curious adversary [34, 35],
i.e., in some sense it may still be regarded as honest be-
havior instead of full cheating. Nevertheless, it provides
Bob with the freedom to choose between accomplishing
the original goal of QOT or achieving a higher average re-
liability, which could leave rooms for potential problems
when building even more complicated cryptographic pro-
tocols upon such a BC-based QOT.
The above cheating strategy is basically the same we
proposed in section 5 of Ref. [45], which was applied to
show why the specific QBC protocol in the same reference
cannot lead to secure QOT. But here we can see that its
power is not limited to the QBC protocol in Ref. [45].
Especially, Bob’s steps related with Eqs. (3) and (4) will
always be valid as long as the BC protocol used in QOT is
not a BCCC, as they do not involve the details of the BC
process. Thus we reach a much general result, that any
BC (except BCCC) cannot lead to unconditionally secure
AoN QOT using Yao’s method [3]. It covers not only
unconditionally secure QBC (regardless whether it exists
or not), but also relativistic BC (both classical [39, 40]
and quantum ones [41, 42]) and practically secure QBC
(e.g., those listed in the introduction of Ref. [45]), even
if all the requirements for them to be secure are already
met. In this sense, QOT is more difficult than QBC, in
contrast to the classical relationship that OT and BC are
quivalent.
This result shows that the original security proof of
BC-based QOT [3] is not general. The proof claimed
that as long as the BC protocol is unconditionally se-
cure, then the QOT protocol built upon it will be uncon-
ditionally secure too. But now we can see that it may
still be valid for BCCC-based QOT, but fails to cover all
unconditionally secure BC.
Now consider 1-2 OT. It can be built upon BC in much
the same way as the above BC-based AoN QOT protocol,
except that step (V) should be modified into:
(V’) Alice sends β0 = b0
⊕
i∈J0
gi and β1 = b1
⊕
i∈J1
gi
to Bob. Bob computes b0 = β0
⊕
i∈J0
hi if J0 = I0, or
b1 = β1
⊕
i∈J1
hi if J1 = I0.
Bob can also apply the above cheating strategy, so that
the result of step (IV) is still described by Eq. (6). After
Alice announced β0 and β1 in step (V’), if Bob wants to
decode b0, he can treat the right-hand side of Eq. (6) as
|Φb〉 = (|0〉S′ ⊗ |J0 = I0〉+ |1〉S′ ⊗ |fail〉)/
√
2, (9)
else if he wants to decode b1, he can treat it as
|Φb〉 = (|0〉S′ ⊗ |fail〉+ |1〉S′ ⊗ |J1 = I0〉)/
√
2. (10)
Comparing these two equations with Eq. (7), we can see
that they both have the form |Φb〉 = (|b〉+ |?〉)/
√
2. Thus
Bob can still apply the POVM described by Eq. (8) to de-
code the bit he wants. Consequently, he can decode one
of b0 and b1 at his choice with reliability (1 +
√
3/2)/2.
Again, despite that the value is higher than the average
reliability of the honest behavior, in the current case Bob
can never decode the bit with reliability 100%. Thus it
still belongs to the honest-but-curious adversaries. Also,
it is important to note that the POVM (E0, I −E0) is a
two-value measurement that can obtain one bit of infor-
mation only, and the POVMs corresponding to Eq. (9)
and Eq. (10) are not the same. Therefore Bob can pick
only one of them to increase the average reliability of one
of b0 and b1, instead of decoding both bits simultaneously.
From the above cheating strategies, we can see that
Bob’s key idea is to keep introducing quantum entangle-
ment to the system, which enables him to keep more and
more data at the quantum level, so that he can have the
freedom on choosing different measurements at a later
time. This gives yet another example showing the power
of entanglement in quantum cryptography.
IV. SECURITY
The above honest-but-curious adversaries indicate that
the BC-based QOT protocol is not unconditionally se-
cure, which is in agreement with the conclusion of the
no-go proofs of QOT [31–37]. Nevertheless, we will show
below that this protocol is secure against the cheating
strategy in other no-go proofs [30, 38].
In Lo’s no-go proof [30], the following definition of 1-2
OT was proposed.
Definition C: Lo’s 1-2 OT
(C-i) Alice inputs i, which is a pair of messages
(m0,m1).
(C-ii) Bob inputs j = 0 or 1.
(C-iii) At the end of the protocol, Bob learns about the
message mj , but not the other message mj¯, i.e., the pro-
tocol is an ideal one-sided two-party secure computation
f(m0,m1, j = 0) = m0 and f(m0,m1, j = 1) = m1.
(C-iv) Alice does not know which mj Bob got.
5It was introduced as a special case of the ideal one-
sided two-party quantum secure computations, defined
in Lo’s proof as follows.
Definition D: ideal one-sided two-party secure compu-
tation
Suppose Alice has a private (i.e. secret) input
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and Bob has a private input j ∈
{1, 2, ...,m}. Alice helps Bob to compute a prescribed
function f(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, ..., p} in such a way that, at the
end of the protocol:
(a) Bob learns f(i, j) unambiguously;
(b) Alice learns nothing [about j or f(i, j)];
(c) Bob knows nothing about i more than what logi-
cally follows from the values of j and f(i, j).
Lo’s proof [30] showed that any protocol satisfying Def-
inition D is insecure, because Bob can always obtain all
f(i, j) (j ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}). As a corollary, secure 1-2 OT
satisfying Definition C is impossible, as Bob can always
learn both m0 and m1.
This result is surprising. As shown in the previous
section, other no-go proofs [31–37] claimed that QOT is
insecure, merely because Bob can increase the average
reliability of the decoded value of one of m0 and m1. It
is never indicated in Refs. [31–37] that he can decode
both of them simultaneously. Thus the cheating strategy
in Lo’s proof [30] seems more powerful.
However, it will be shown below that Lo’s proof is not
sufficiently general to cover all kinds of QOT. We must
notice that Definition C is not rigorously equivalent to
Definition B. An important feature of Definition C is that
all Alice’s (Bob’s) input to the entire protocol is merely
i = {m0,m1} (j = {0, 1}). Furthermore, as can be seen
from (C-i) and (C-iii), the inputs i and j are indepen-
dent of each other. But in general, seldom any protocol
satisfies these requirement. That is, let us denote all Al-
ice’s (Bob’s) input to a protocol as I (J). In Definition
C there is I = i, J = j, and I, J are independent. But
most existing quantum cryptographic protocols generally
have I ⊃ i, J ⊃ j, and I, J are dependent of each other.
For example, in the well-known Bennett-Brassard 1984
(BB84) QKD protocol [1], though the aim of Alice and
Bob is to share a secret key k, the protocol cannot be
modeled as a simple box to which Alice inputs k, then
Bob gets the output k. Instead, more inputs of both
participants have to be involved. Alice should first in-
put some quantum states (denoted as input i1), and
Bob inputs and announces his measurement bases (in-
put j1). Then Alice tells Bob which bases are correct
(input i2), followed by a security check in which Bob
reveals some measurement results (input j2), and Alice
verifies whether these results are correct or not (input
i3). Alice also reveals some results for Bob to verify . . .
Finally they obtain k from the remaining unannounced
measurement results. Obviously Alice cannot determine
i2 without knowing j1, Bob’s j2 will be affected by Al-
ice’s i1, . . . , the final key k is also affected by the i’s and
j’s. Thus we see that in the BB84 protocol, the inputs
I = {i1, i2, . . .} and J = {j1, j2, . . .} are dependent of
each other. For an eavesdropper, even though parts of I
and J are revealed, it is still insufficient to decode k.
This is also the case for OT. Alice and Bob generally
need to send quantum states, perform operations and
exchanges lots of information throughout the entire pro-
tocol. All these (e.g., Alice’s {ai, gi}, R, β0, β1 and Bob’s
{bi, hi}, {J0, J1} in the protocol in section III) should be
treated as parts of their inputs. Consequently, there is
I ⊃ i and J ⊃ j. Definition B requires that Alice has
zero knowledge about j. But it does not necessarily imply
that she has zero knowledge about J . Therefore I and J
can be dependent of each other. Indeed, step (V’) of the
BC-based 1-2 QOT protocol in section III clearly shows
that I includes not only the secret bits b0 and b1, but also
depends on how Bob selects J0 and J1 in step (IV). Mean-
while, Bob’s announcing J0 and J1 does not necessarily
reveal his choice of j. Therefore, comparing with Defini-
tions C and D, the BC-based 1-2 QOT protocol cannot
be viewed as an ideal function f(i(m0,m1), j), where i
and j are merely the private inputs of Alice and Bob,
respectively. Instead, it has the form f(I(m0,m1, J), J),
where Alice’ input I will be varied according to Bob’s in-
put J , and its value is not determined until Bob’s input
has been completed. That is, BC-based 1-2 QOT does
not satisfy Definition C.
With this feature, the cheating strategy in Lo’s proof
can be defeated, as it was pointed out in Ref. [48]
which will be reviewed below. According to Lo’s
strategy, Bob can cheat in 1-2 OT satisfying Defini-
tion C, because he can change the value of j from
j1 to j2 by applying a unitary transformation to his
own quantum machine alone. This enables him to
learn f(i(m0,m1), j1) and f(i(m0,m1), j2) simultane-
ously without being found by Alice. However, in a
protocol described by the function f(I(m0,m1, J), J), a
value in the form f(I(m0,m1, J(1)), J(2)) (with J(k) de-
noting Bob’s input corresponding to jk) will be mean-
ingless. Without the help of Alice, Bob cannot change I
from I(m0,m1, J(1)) to I(m0,m1, J(2)). Hence he cannot
learn f(I(m0,m1, J(1)), J(1)) and f(I(m0,m1, J(2)), J(2))
simultaneously by himself. Thus the BC-based 1-2 QOT
protocol is immune to this cheating.
Now we prove it in a more rigorous mathematical form,
following the procedure in the appendix of Ref. [48]. Ac-
cording to the cheating strategy in Lo’s proof as shown
in section III of Ref. [30], in any protocol satisfying Def-
inition D, Alice and Bob’s actions on their quantum ma-
chines can be summarized as an overall unitary transfor-
mation U applied to the initial state |u〉in ∈ HA ⊗ HB,
i.e.
|u〉fin = U |u〉in . (11)
When both parties are honest,
∣∣uh〉
in
= |i〉A ⊗ |j〉B and∣∣uh〉
fin
= |vij〉 ≡ U(|i〉A ⊗ |j〉B). (12)
6Thus the density matrix that Bob has at the end of pro-
tocol is
ρi,j = TrA |vij〉 〈vij | . (13)
Bob can cheat in this protocol, because given j1, j2 ∈
{1, 2, ...,m}, there exists a unitary transformation U j1,j2
such that
U j1,j2ρi,j1(U j1,j2)−1 = ρi,j2 (14)
for all i. It means that Bob can change the value of
j from j1 to j2 by applying a unitary transformation
independent of i to the state of his quantum machine.
This equation is derived as follows [30].
Alice may entangle the state of her quantum machine
A with her quantum dice D and prepares the initial state
1√
n
∑
i
|i〉D ⊗ |i〉A . (15)
She keeps D for herself and uses the second register A to
execute the protocol. Supposing that Bob’s input is j1,
the initial state is
|u′〉in =
1√
n
∑
i
|i〉D ⊗ |i〉A ⊗ |j1〉B . (16)
At the end of the protocol, it follows from Eqs. (11) and
(16) that the total wave function of the combined system
D, A, and B is
|vj1 〉in =
1√
n
∑
i
|i〉D ⊗ U(|i〉A ⊗ |j1〉B). (17)
Similarly, if Bob’s input is j2, the total wave function at
the end will be
|vj2 〉in =
1√
n
∑
i
|i〉D ⊗ U(|i〉A ⊗ |j2〉B). (18)
Due to the requirement (b) in Definition D, the reduced
density matrices in Alice’s hand for the two cases j = j1
and j = j2 must be the same, i.e.
ρAlicej1 = TrB |vj1 〉 〈vj1 | = TrB |vj2〉 〈vj2 | = ρAlicej2 . (19)
Equivalently, |vj1〉 and |vj2〉 have the same Schmidt de-
composition
|vj1〉 =
∑
k
ak |αk〉AD ⊗ |βk〉B (20)
and
|vj2〉 =
∑
k
ak |αk〉AD ⊗ |β′k〉B . (21)
Now consider the unitary transformation U j1,j2 that ro-
tates |βk〉B to |β′k〉B. Notice that it acts on HB alone and
yet, as can be seen from Eqs. (20) and (21), it rotates
|vj1〉 to |vj2〉, i.e.
|vj2〉 = U j1,j2 |vj1 〉 . (22)
Since
D 〈i |vj〉 = 1√
n
|vij〉 (23)
[see Eqs. (12), (17), and (18)], by multiplying Eq. (22)
by D 〈i| on the left, one finds that
|vij2 〉 = U j1,j2 |vij1 〉 . (24)
Taking the trace of |vij2 〉 〈vij2 | over HA and using Eq.
(24), Eq. (14) can be obtained.
Eqs. (11) - (24) are exactly those presented in Lo’s
proof [30]. We now consider the BC-based 1-2 QOT pro-
tocol. Since it has the feature that Alice’s input I is
dependent of Bob’s input J , in the above proof, all i in
the equations should be replaced by I(J) from the very
beginning. Consequently, Eq. (23) becomes
D 〈I(J)| vJ 〉 = 1√
n
∣∣vI(J)J〉 . (25)
In this case, multiplying Eq. (22) by D
〈
I(2)
∣∣ (I(2) ≡
I(J(2)) for short) on the left cannot give Eq. (24) any
more. Instead, the result is∣∣vI(2)J(2)〉 = UJ(1),J(2)U I(1),I(2) ∣∣vI(1)J(1)〉 , (26)
where U I(1),I(2) ≡D
∣∣I(2)〉 〈I(1)∣∣D. Then Eq. (14) is re-
placed by
UJ(1),J(2)U I(1),I(2)ρI(1),J(1)(UJ(1),J(2)U I(1),I(2))−1 = ρI(2),J(2) .
(27)
Note that U I(1),I(2) is the unitary operation on Alice’s
side. This implies that without Alice’s help, Bob can-
not change the density matrix he has from ρI(1),J(1) to
ρI(2),J(2) . That is why Bob’s cheating strategy fails.
In brief, Lo’s no-go proof on ideal one-sided two-party
secure computations [30] cannot cover the above BC-
based 1-2 QOT, because the proof studied merely the
protocols in which the inputs of the participants are inde-
pendent. As we mentioned, even the BB84 protocol does
not satisfy this requirement, while it can still be used as
a black box to build more sophisticated protocols, e.g.,
quantum secret sharing. Thus we see that black box pro-
tocols do not necessarily require independent inputs of
the participants. The model used in Lo’s proof is too
ideal, so that many useful protocols in quantum cryptog-
raphy are not covered.
Similarly, a recent no-go proof on two-sided two-party
secure computations [38] is also based on a model of pro-
tocols with independent inputs. Moreover, the proof con-
tains a logical loophole on the use of the security def-
inition [49]. Therefore its conclusion is not sufficiently
general either.
7V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSIONS
We elaborated how Bob can make use of quantum
entanglement to break the above BC-based QOT and
achieve a higher average reliability of the decoded value
of the transferred bit, even under certain practical set-
tings in which the no-go proofs for secure QBC become
invalid. Meanwhile, we also showed that BC-based QOT,
though not unconditionally secure, can defeat certain
kinds of cheating which attempt to decode all transferred
bits simultaneously with reliability 100%. Thus it is still
valuable for building some “post-cold-war era” quantum
cryptographies.
This insecurity proof is valid as long as the secure BC
used in the QOT protocol is not BCCC. It covers rel-
ativistic BC [39–42], as well as many practically secure
QBC [50–52], conditionally secure QBC [53], computa-
tionally secure QBC [54–56], cheat-sensitive QBC [57–
62], and some other types of protocols [45, 63–65]. Nev-
ertheless, when Bob is limited to bounded or noisy quan-
tum storages, secure QOT can be made possible in prac-
tice with two approaches. On one hand, with this tech-
nological constraint BCCC can be obtained [66–74]. This
is because Bob can no longer keep system C in Eq. (1)
(which represents the systems Bi⊗φi⊗Hi⊗E mentioned
below Eq. (4) or Bi ⊗ φi ⊗Hi ⊗E′i in Eq. (6)) perfectly
in the entangled form shown by these equations once the
protocol lasts too long or requires too much quantum
storages. Thus BC-based QOT protocol in section III
can be secure at least against the insecurity proof in this
paper. On the other hand, bounded or noisy storages can
also force Bob to measure the quantum states he receives,
as long as the QOT protocol involves too much qubits or
the time interval between each step is sufficiently long.
BC is no longer needed to convince Alice that Bob has
already completed the measurements. Then there can be
QOT protocols not based on BC, which are proven to be
practically secure [68–71, 75–77].
We should also note that, even without the as-
sumption of such technological limitations, our above
insecurity proof does not mean that all QOT must not
be unconditionally secure in principle. This is because
the existing method [3] is not necessarily the only way to
build OT from BC. Further more, there is no evidence
indicating that OT has to be built upon BC. Therefore,
it is still worth questioning whether other kinds of
unconditionally secure OT exist, especially relativistic
OT.
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